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INTRODUCTION
Regional development agencies (DAs) have been operational in most 
regions of Europe since the 1990s. Charged mainly with the task of 
stimulating bottom-up development based on the mobilization of local 
and regional resources, DAs have to work in partnership with other local 
and regional organizations (Danson and Lloyd, 2012; Halkier, 2012a). DAs 
differ widely across jurisdictions in terms of their origins, size, tasks, and 
degree of autonomy. While in some countries DAs are the products of local 
bottom-up initiatives without national coordination, in other countries 
they are formed by national governments. Still in some other (especially 
federal) countries DAs are initiated by city or regional government action 
in partnership with private sector actors. DAs also differ significantly 
with respect to the wider institutional settings in which they operate. This 
suggests that DAs have different potential, and scope, for entering into 
relationships operating between and across different tiers of government 
(local, regional, national, supranational) in multi-level settings and they 
have differing capacities to take part in multi-local dynamics.
As against the background of mushrooming regional development 
agencies in most European countries in the past four decades, DAs did 
not come into existence in Turkey until the mid-2000s, with the exception 
of a few local bottom-up initiatives. The critical turning point came with 
Turkey’s admission as a candidate country to the European Union (EU) in 
December 1999. The EU requirement to set up DAs was first mentioned in 
the Accession Partnership Document in 2003 as part of the efforts to align 
Turkey’s regional policy with that of the EU.
Throughout the 1990s and until the mid-2000s, EU conditionality and 
pre-accession financial assistance programs promoted the removal of 
the “exclusive right” of the central state to define the means and goals 
of regional development not through formal constitutional changes but 
through “the setting of the rules and principles of the disbursement” of 
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the pre-accession funds (Bruszt, 2008, 614). These principles included the 
formation of DAs in countries where regionalized institutions did not exist, 
hence making DAs the goal of policy for encouraging the decentralization 
of regional development governance (Hughes et al., 2004; Bache, 2010). This 
approach has been part and parcel of the EU’s regional policy since the 
first major reform of the Structural Funds, the main delivery mechanism, in 
1988 (CEC, 1988). The 1988 reform introduced the principles of partnership 
and subsidiarity, which envisage shared decision-making across territorial 
levels. This potentially provides for greatly enhanced regional involvement 
in policy-making, and thus introduces a bottom-up approach to regional 
policy design, implementation and monitoring. The main policy idea 
behind these principles is to promote regional development through 
bottom-up, local initiatives, networks and soft factors such as research and 
development (Keating, 2008). The EU’s promotion of the regional level in 
candidate countries took a sharp turn in the mid-2000s and instead put 
an emphasis on centralized planning and delivery of regional policy in 
candidate countries mainly as a response to the experience of irregularities 
in the management of pre-accession funds (Hughes et al., 2004; Bache, 
2010). As a result, in contrast to the former candidate countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, DAs in Turkey do not play a role in the administration 
of EU financial assistance.
For Turkish officials, the DAs strictly represent policy instruments rather 
than a policy goal of decentralization. In a separate research carried out 
by the author in Summer 2015, all 15 mid and high-level bureaucrats 
interviewed at the General Directorate for Regional Development and 
Structural Adjustment in the Ministry of Development concurred in the 
following statement: “Regional Development Agencies have never been an 
aim of regional policy in Turkey. They [DAs] solely represent instruments 
for policy implementation” (Ertugal, forthcoming). The assumption 
behind the conception of DAs as policy instruments by national policy 
practitioners is that DAs are apolitical, neutral and technical devices for 
achieving optimum development outcomes. This article, in conformity 
with the prevailing notion of DAs as instruments among national policy 
practitioners, examines the functioning of the DAs in Turkey from a 
policy instruments approach. In doing so, however, this article challenges 
the notion that policy instruments can be apolitical or neutral. This is 
where this article departs from the assumptions held by national policy 
practitioners. Instead, as the next section will elaborate, it is argued that 
policy instruments do have significant political and power implications in 
contrast to the liberal and modern disguise under which they are conceived 
or presented (2). Therefore, the policy instruments approach adopted in 
this article seeks to uncover both the intended and unintended effects as 
well as the political consequences of DAs in their functioning in order 
to answer whether DAs could become focal points for empowerment of 
sub-national actors and mobilization of endogenous growth capacities. 
It aims to shed light on the potential of DAs to institutionalize regions 
as legitimate political forms if the former are to be effective agents of 
economic development. The article proceeds by elaborating the policy 
instruments approach and how it is used to capture important dimensions 
of DA activity. The next section presents the research design and sources 
of data. This is followed by a presentation of empirical findings. The final 
section on Conclusions summarizes the main findings. 
2. An increasing amount of research 
demonstrates the political effects of various 
policy instruments such as the Regulatory 
Impact Assessment (Dunlop et al., 2012) 
or the Impact Assessment (Radaelli and 
Meuwese, 2010). Perhaps the best example 
for the purposes of this article is the work by 
Bache (2010) who shows how the partnership 
instrument in EU regional policy, although 
presented as a technical device, has been a 
highly political instrument with different 
purposes and effects in different contexts.
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THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS APPROACH
The policy instruments approach was recently advanced by Lascoumes 
and Le Gales (2007) and Kassim and Le Gales (2010) building on previous 
work by Salamon (2002) and Hood (1986). This approach challenges 
the functionalist view that instruments are merely technical and neutral 
devices for realizing policy aims in the most effective way. In fact, as 
Majone (1989) argues, policy instruments are never neutral. Instead, policy 
instruments approach argues that policy instruments produce their own 
effects independent of the aims attributed to them (Lascoumes and Le 
Gales, 2007; Kassim and Le Gales, 2010):
“A public policy instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and 
social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those 
it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007, 4).”
This definition has two implications. First, as instruments of regional 
policy, the DAs should be studied through focusing on their 
instrumentation, which requires an understanding of how they are 
operationalized or the kind of effects they produce (Lascoumes and 
Le Gales, 2007, 4). These effects include both a technical component 
involving their operational quality, techniques and procedures, and a 
social component, which directs attention to their meaning for power 
relationships and how they are used/interpreted by different actors. 
The social component captures the political dimension of instruments. 
In this process of both technical and social instrumentation, the DAs 
acquire meaning that goes well beyond their instrumental value. Second, 
analyzing the effects of instruments necessitates their conceptualization 
as institutions (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Kassim and Le Gales, 
2010). The DAs, as institutions, inevitably shape actor behavior, privilege 
certain interests over others and favor certain policy solutions over others. 
The policy instruments approach, therefore, recognizes the gap between 
rules embedded in the technical component of instruments and their 
implementation by actors (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, 13). Since actors do not 
necessarily blindly follow the rules there is almost always an unavoidable 
element of “openness in the interpretation and implementation” of rules 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, 10). This is why it is important to uncover 
both the intended and unintended consequences of instruments, which 
may otherwise go unnoticed due to their legitimization based on their 
modernist and liberal image. 
There is no one single framework with which to approach the DAs as 
instruments. As mentioned in the introduction, the DAs have acquired 
increasingly complex structures and are highly differentiated across 
jurisdictions. Hence, there are a myriad of ways in which the DAs can be 
studied depending on the theoretical framework adopted and the context-
specific features. For the purposes of this article the four key dimensions 
identified below represent the most relevant features to be investigated 
for understanding the political, power and governance effects of DAs in 
order to assess their potential to become focal points for empowerment 
of sub-national actors, mobilization of endogenous growth capacities and 
to institutionalize regions as legitimate political forms. While existing 
comparative and case studies of the DAs do not exhibit a common, unified 
framework for analysis, many of them utilize either one or more of the 
dimensions identified in this article (Syrett and Silva, 2001; Shaw and 
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Lloyd, 2000; Ferry, 2007; Pike et al., 2012; Johansson and Rylander, 2012; 
Bramanti and Rosso, 2012).
The analytical focus, as befits a policy instruments approach, is both on 
the technical and social instrumentation of DAs and the (un)intended 
consequences that the process of instrumentation produces. Based on 
recent studies of regional DAs operating in various European countries, 
four key dimensions of the DA activity have been identified for analysis. 
First, existing research increasingly points to the critical role played by 
the regional level in innovation and growth (Crevoisier and Jeannerat, 
2009; Visser and Atzema, 2008). Supporting and stimulating knowledge 
dynamics in regions and building on the strengths of regions constitute 
the main pillars of EU regional policy (Böhme and Waterhout, 2008). In 
this context, the DAs have a special mandate, or at least are expected to 
flexibly manage and improve knowledge dynamics among multiple actors 
in the regions in order to foster competitiveness. Given the confirmed link 
between innovation and governance (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008), it is 
impossible to imagine a successful region without a DA with a substantial 
level of technical and operational capacity (Roncevic, 2012). This renders 
the analysis of their techniques and procedures involving operational 
qualities, including staff, resources and flexibility essential for evaluating 
their capacity to promote competitiveness. It is the DAs with qualified 
and adequate human resources, knowledge assets, and with intra-regional 
networking skills that are likely to gain the kind of political legitimacy that 
would allow them to be an engine of development (Bellini et al., 2012b). 
Given that competitiveness is the mandate of Turkish DAs too, more 
specific questions in this dimension relate to key positions in the DAs, how 
they are selected and resources of the DAs (3). 
The remaining three key dimensions identified for this article relate to the 
social component of the DA instrumentation. Given that the DAs are not 
supposed to be stand-alone units, but rather part of a continuous process 
of interaction, negotiation, guidance, and/or persuasion with other public 
and private actors, the social component directs attention to these complex 
relationships. One of the manifestations of these complex relationships is 
the embedding of the DAs among public and private economic actors of the 
region, whereby the latter become partners (Jones, 2003). Existing research 
shows that such partnershipping runs the risk of the DAs being captured 
by vested interests, potentially causing the DAs to lose their ability to take 
on a long-term objective view of development initiatives (Bellini et al., 
2012a, 3; Larsen, 2012). This risk is especially greatest in peripheral and 
lagging regions, where the type of change that a region needs may not take 
place for being contrary to the self-interest of the local elite (Barca, 2009a, 
21; Acemoğlu and Johnson, 2006, 328). It is thus imperative to investigate 
the involved partners in the DAs and their interrelationship in order to 
understand whether the DAs are captured in regressive coalitions of 
established interests and power relations. To the extent that short-term 
inward looking concerns dominate the DAs’ agenda, the extent to which 
the DAs can make a difference is debatable.
Another manifestation of the DAs’ complex relationships is in the 
architecture of multi-level governance. Much has been written about the 
shift towards multi-level governance and network relations within which 
the DAs constitute an integral feature (Cooke and Morgan, 1993; Marks, 
1993; Halkier and Danson, 1997; Bache and Flinders, 2005; Halkier, 2006). 
Given that the DAs cannot be expected to be the sole providers of answers 
3. The draft version of the law establishing 
DAs in Turkey contained a 40-page long 
justification when it was first submitted 
to the Turkish parliament. In the text 
provided for justification, the mandate of 
DAs is defined to include the promotion 
of innovation and competitiveness in the 
regions (Draft Law, 2005).
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to development challenges in the regions (Bellini et al., 2012b), the patterns 
of their coordination with local actors and with other tiers of government 
need to be investigated. If multi-level governance is operating in inflexible 
and segmented ways, the extent to which the DAs can fulfill their mandates 
is highly limited. Whereas the horizontal dimension of multi-level 
governance concerns the degree of participation of local stakeholders in 
the activities of the DAs, the vertical dimension concerns the nature of 
relations with the central administration. It is important to identify who 
has the “formal monopoly of taking a binding decision” for issues of 
regional development and whether central intervention is for the purpose 
of removing development traps, leaving discretionary powers with regard 
to strategic initiatives and implementation to the DAs (Bruszt, 2008, 611; 
Barca, 2009b).
Still another manifestation of complex relationships is the DAs’ ability to 
contribute to a great degree of integration between different policy areas 
(Johansson and Rylander, 2012). Halkier and Danson (1997) call this the 
integrated implementation capacity. The ability of the DAs to integrate 
between different policy areas is crucial if parallel policies instituted by 
other tiers of government that address similar issues are not to preclude 
efforts by the DAs (Halkier, 2012b). This ability partly depends on the 
number of policy areas in which the DAs are engaged and the diversity 
of policy resources (hard and soft) at their disposal (Halkier and Danson, 
1997, 246-50). Integrated implementation more crucially depends on the 
administrative capacities for co-ordination between both line ministries 
such as for health, education, transport, industry, agriculture and 
environment and lower levels of local governance such as municipalities. 
These four dimensions together capture the “multiscalar” quality of the 
DA activity (Gertler, 1997, 48). Despite the fact that the contemporary DAs 
are characterized by highly differentiated functions, structures, powers 
and strategies operating within diverse political, economic and social 
environments (Halkier, 2012a), the major challenge commonly faced 
concerns their capacity to carve out a role as “strategic power-brokers” 
between the central administration and those bodies already present in the 
region (Pearce and Ayres, 2009, 537; Webb and Collis, 2000; Ferry, 2007). 
This was also recognized in one of the rare and earlier studies on the DAs 
in Turkey, which argued that enjoying institutional legitimacy would be 
the main challenge (Lagendijk et al., 2009; Kayasü and Eldeniz, 2013). 
With regard to implementation, the DAs have to influence the investment 
decisions of public bodies operating in the region and putting mechanisms 
in place to draw lessons from project and program evaluations and 
improvement of the regional database (Tewdwr-Jones and Phelps, 2000).
THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This article combines documentary review with semi-structured 
interviews in six different regions of Turkey conducted between 2011 
and 2014. Documentary review includes a compilation of relevant 
statutory legislation, annual activity reports conducted by the Ministry 
of Development, external evaluation reports, parliamentary minutes, and 
regional plans, working programs and activity reports of DAs published on 
their websites covering the period 2010-2016. 
In total 37 semi-structured interviews were conducted in six regions (For a 
full list see Appendix 1). In selecting the interviewees, attention was paid to 
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select respondents in different settings with varying degrees of relationship 
to the DAs. Twenty-four of the interviewees represent top and mid-level 
management in local organizations that are members of either the decision-
making or the consultative bodies of the DAs. Nine of the 24 interviewees 
do not participate in the activities of the DAs on an individual basis 
(interviews 8, 9, 14, 16, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37 in Appendix 1). Attention was also 
paid to have a balanced representation of the public and private sectors 
and civil society in each region. The remaining 13 interviewees represent 
the staff working full-time for the DAs. The number of interviewees in each 
region was largely determined by the principle of saturation, whereby a 
threshold was reached after which findings kept repeating themselves. 
Interviews were conducted in six Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS) II regions which comprise: 1) İzmir, 2) İstanbul, 3) 
Çukurova (Adana-Mersin), 4) Mardin-Batman-Siirt-Şırnak, 5) Şanlıurfa-
Diyarbakır, and 6) Kastamonu-Çankırı-Sinop. Of the selected six regions, 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the first three regions is 
above 75% of Turkey’s average, whereas the GDP per capita of the three 
latter regions is less than 75% of Turkey’s average. The income difference 
between the richest region (İstanbul) and the poorest region (Mardin-
Batman-Siirt-Şırnak) is almost fourfold. The reason for selection of regions 
based on GDP per capita levels is to ensure representativeness through 
capturing potential diversity so that findings could be generalized to all 
regions in Turkey.
The purpose of the interviews was to elicit data on four dimensions of the 
DA activity outlined in the previous section. Information gathered through 
interviews was converted into text by means of transcription. Interpretation 
of the content of the text was based on two types of categorization. First, 
the information source was identified in terms of the site of the interviewee 
(characteristics of the relationship to the DA). Second, patterns of issues 
and relationships were identified within and across text. In doing so, both 
similarities and differences across the text and the underlying reasons 
for these patterns (such as the sites of the interviewees) were identified. 
Observed patterns in interview data were then compared and contrasted to 
patterns observed in documentary review. Thus, the analysis in this article 
is based on triangulation of both methods (interviews and documentary 
review) and different data sources (interviewees based in different 
regions and in different settings) (Denzin, 1989). It should be emphasized 
that the interview data, analyzed as such, displays strong convergence 
around certain themes regardless of the sites of the interviewees (whether 
representing the public sector, the private sector or the civil society). In 
reporting interview data, recurring themes around which there is strong 
convergence are emphasized. Also, information is provided concerning 
the number of respondents who emphasize recurring themes in order 
to convey a sense of the strength of the patterns observed (rather than a 
quantitative distribution of attitudes). Interview quotes are used merely 
to illustrate these patterns. Where direct interview quotes are used, the 
interviewee number is mentioned in brackets, which can then be traced to 
the list provided in Appendix 1 to see whether that particular interviewee 
represents the public or the private sector or the civil society.
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the dominant characteristics of 
regional governance challenges centered on the DAs. In doing so, the focus 
of the article is mainly on revealing common patterns across regions, even 
though their intensity and the exact ways in which they play out differ 
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from region to region and over time. The concluding section of the article 
includes a brief discussion of regional differences.
DAs AS POLICY INSTRUMENTS: BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS
Background
Statistical regions at NUTS II level in Turkey were formed in 2002 by 
bringing together NUTS III regions, provinces, which constitute the main 
territorial administrative unit. Of the 26 NUTS II regions in total, only three 
are at the same time NUTS III, provinces of Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. The 
rest of the NUTS II level regions consist of two or more provinces. It was 
decided to set up the DAs for each NUTS II level region by law adopted 
by parliament in 2006 (Official Journal, 2006a). Adoption of the law was 
followed by a period of legal challenges which were finally resolved in 2007 
after which the DAs were gradually established. Turkish DAs, therefore, 
have a very recent history with only two pilot DAs (İzmir and Çukurova) 
having existed since 2006. 
According to law, the composition of the DAs for each region is the 
same except for some minor differences in regions that consist of one 
province only, Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. All the DAs have three main 
units: decision-making body, consultative body and executive body. The 
decision-making body, the Board of Directors, is composed of the following 
local actors: governors of the provinces that make up the region, heads of 
provincial assemblies, mayors of municipalities of the provincial centers, 
presidents of provincial chambers of commerce and/or industry. In regions 
made up of one province only, the decision-making body includes three 
additional members representing the private sector and/or civil society, 
who are elected by the consultative body. The law stipulates that the 
consultative bodies, Development Councils, should comprise 100 members 
representing the public and private sectors and civil society. The executive 
bodies in the form of General Secretariats constitute the full-time staff of 
the DAs conducting day-to-day operations. A General Secretary heads 
General Secretariats. Both the General Secretaries and the staff under them 
work on a contractual basis. 
The Ministry of Development coordinates the activities of the DAs. 
Decisions taken by the Board of Directors concerning regional plans, 
working programs and the budget are subject to the approval of this 
Ministry while regional plans also have to get the approval of the Regional 
Development High Board composed of ministers of line ministries. Most 
of the financial resources of the DAs come from the general budget. 
Responsibilities of the DAs include mobilization of local resources through 
forming regional partnerships, preparation and implementation of regional 
plans, promotion of regional development and regional competitiveness, 
and reduction of intra-regional disparities. 
Similar to those in European countries, the DAs in Turkey rely primarily 
on soft policy resources in the form of grants for (co)funded projects, 
(in)direct forms of financial support as well as informational and 
organizational support to small and medium sized enterprises. The only 
traditional policy instrument at their disposal is inward investment offices 
to help potential investors with paperwork. Again similar to the DAs 
in Europe, the main targets of policy are public institutions and private 
firms (such as governorates, municipalities, chambers) operating in the 
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region (Dahlström et al., 2012, 15-6). With regard to their strategies, the 
objectives of the DAs in Turkey as expressed in the regional plans are 
almost in unison with those in Europe reflecting the competitiveness 
oriented EU-Lisbon Strategy (Dahlström et al., 2012, 33). In the first round 
of regional plans formulated for the period 2010/2011-2013, the efficiency 
objective (regional competitiveness) clearly dominated as opposed to the 
equity objective (equality-oriented goals). The latter entered into plans in 
only 13 of the 26 regions (Working Group, 2012). In the second round of 
regional plans for 2013-2023, both efficiency and equity objectives are given 
almost equal weight in a majority of the regions. However, the financial, 
informational and organizational support programs of all the DAs aimed at 
implementation clearly favor the efficiency objective.
There are several problems with regard to the position of the DAs within 
Turkey’s system of public administration. Prior to the 2002 decision of the 
Council of Ministers, no statistical or planning regions existed at the NUTS 
II or any other sub-national level. The DAs, established by law, correspond 
to the NUTS II level regions. While the DAs are conceived as semi-
departmental (through the Board of Directors) legal entities, they do not 
have a constitutional status. Moreover, the DAs do not fit into any of the 
administrative concepts defined in Turkey’s Constitution. Even the term 
agency is an alien concept. The law establishing the DAs does not define 
the latter as “regional administrations”. Moreover, the DAs do not form 
a part of the central administration or the field organization of the central 
administration or the local administration. Hence, the status of the DAs 
within the hierarchical administrative structure and vis-à-vis the center-
local relations remains ambiguous. Lack of clarity in the DAs’ relationship 
to other public institutions potentially creates problems of overlapping 
competencies and authority especially where they carry out similar aims.
Empirical Findings
This section presents the findings of this study for each of the four 
dimensions of the DA activity identified in line with a policy instruments 
approach. 
Operational Qualities: Staff, Resources, Flexibility and Innovation 
Research on the DAs in European countries has unequivocally shown 
that people and money are the key assets that make a difference to their 
performance (Bramanti and Rosso, 2012, 270). The technical skills of 
staff are the outcomes of long years of training, project management 
and trial and error procedures (Bramanti and Rosso, 2012, 275). Equally, 
most of the DAs in Europe are sponsored by several tiers of government 
(national, regional and local), which enables the former to operate as semi-
autonomous entities strengthening the arm’s length principle (Halkier, 
2012b, 38).
In the Turkish DAs a distinction is made between the General Secretary 
and the staff (Official Journal, 2006b). The recruitment of the General 
Secretary is based first on a nomination by the Board of Directors and 
second on the approval of the Ministry of Development. The Board of 
Directors can unilaterally terminate the employment contracts of General 
Secretaries. In the recruitment of expert and supporting staff, candidates 
who are new graduates are required to have received a certain level in 
nation-wide professional and language examinations held for entering 
the civil service (Official Journal, 2006b). Having passed those thresholds, 
candidates are then invited to job interviews. Official reports confirm that 
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these procedures are being adhered to (Kalkınma Bakanlığı; 2012; 2013). All 
37 interviews further confirm that high-quality staff was recruited for the 
DAs, even in the lagging regions. 
Opportunities are severely limited with regard to promotion. All of the 
staff interviewed stress that there is not a promising career path. The best 
that the expert staff can do is to be promoted as the head of unit. There 
are five units on average in each DA where between 30 and 40 personnel 
work as experts (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013). There is the possibility that 
the head of a unit could be appointed as the General Secretary. However, 
according to law the latter could equally be appointed externally. Another 
important factor for retaining staff is the level of wages. The High Planning 
Board, composed of ministers, set the level of the DA staff wages higher 
than the salaries of bureaucrats in the capital in 2009 when the first round 
of recruitment had started (Sayıştay Başkanlığı, 2014). In the words of an 
interviewee, it was “as a consequence of relatively high wages that high-
quality staff could be attracted to the least developed regions” (interview 
13). Since then, however, wages have deteriorated due to inflation and 
“lack of any decision taken by the High Planning Board” to enable an 
upward adjustment in wages (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 788-89) so 
that “it has become more attractive to work in the civil service in Ankara 
as the wages are about the same” (interview 24). As a result, the DA staff 
is losing motivation and looking for jobs elsewhere (Devlet Denetleme 
Kurulu, 2014, 788). According an interviewee’s observation there is “30 
percent staff loss” in the DAs of the lagging regions (interview 23).
There is a high degree of openness to learning new technologies and 
methods of analysis in regional planning among the DA staff as a function 
of their quality and young age. However, they often come from diverse 
backgrounds and need at least a certain level of orientation in development. 
Beyond that, interviewees stress training needs in areas such as cluster 
analysis, input-output analysis and projection as the DA staff in general 
have weak competency in regional planning methods and analysis (Devlet 
Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 791). In order to meet these needs the Ministry 
of Development provides a minimum of ten days of training every year 
(Kalkınma Bakanlığı; 2012; 2013), which according to most interviewees is 
nowhere near sufficient. Inadequacies of both formal training and on the 
job experience due to high levels of staff turnover undermine flexibility and 
innovation in operational functions. This weakness is further aggravated 
by the lack of reliable data at local and regional scales, which leads to 
not only the production of sub-quality regional plans (especially in the 
first round) (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 778-80), containing hardly 
any spatial analysis and sophisticated outcome indicators, but also to the 
incomparability of analyses across regions. 
Fiscally, not only the size of the DA budgets is meager but they are also 
overwhelmingly dependent on the central government. Annually 0.05% 
of the general budget is allocated for the DAs. This represents around 85% 
of the DAs’ financial resources. The rest is provided by contributions from 
municipalities, provincial assemblies and chambers of commerce and/
or industry. The annual budget of a DA is roughly around €30 million. 
Almost all of the interviewees are in agreement that the minimal size of the 
DA budgets reduces their relevance in regional development governance. 
Moreover, excessive dependence on the central government is a crippling 
factor for the arm’s length principle threatening to render the DAs as mere 
extensions of the central administration.
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Power Relationships 
Responses to 30 out of 37 interviews indicate that there are significant 
efforts to divert financial resources of the DAs for particularistic interests 
as opposed to the general interest. In the words of an interviewee, “the 
members of the Board of Directors are in competition to influence the 
distribution of the financial resources” (interview 19). The Board of 
Directors “applies pressure on the General Secretary to make sure that 
project applications on behalf of their institutions or from their clients 
qualify for funding” (interview 29). Since institutional members of the 
Board make compulsory contributions to the DA budget, “each wants 
to get back as much as possible through winning grants” (interview 
21). At a minimum, Board members seek to influence the evaluation of 
project proposals, which should be an independent process (interview 
21). Additionally, there is rivalry between provinces that make up the 
region. Most provincial governors “engage in cheap thinking calculating 
the number of projects that receive grants in their province as opposed to 
the number of projects in other provinces” (interview 14). Hence, there is 
a widespread perception that the DA financial support tends to benefit 
particularistic interests rather than the general interest. The evaluation 
report stresses that the distribution of financial resources through grants 
has come to dominate DAs’ operations at the expense of the provision of 
informational and organizational resources (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 
2014, 777). Moreover, despite legislation to the contrary, the financial 
resources of the DAs are used to support the routine activities or to lower 
operational costs of those local organizations that are Board members 
(Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 785) (4).
The calls for proposals as part of the grant scheme that the DAs administer 
constitute another potential channel through which the members of the 
Board of Directors try to influence the diversion of financial resources. 
Whereas the purpose of the calls for proposals should be to implement a 
specific part of the regional plan, the majority of the interviewees among 
the DA staff claim: 
“There is no relationship between the calls for proposals and the regional 
plan. Those in the Board of Directors do not even read the regional plan. 
For example, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry wants to support a 
specific sector. So we announce a call for proposals for that sector. Every 
year we announce calls for different sectors. One year we support the 
tourism sector, the next year we support leather manufacturing. Despite 
limited resources there is no long-term thinking. If we support one sector 
this year why should we withdraw from that sector the next year?” 
(interview 30) (5).
A review of regional plans and calls for proposals for 26 DAs shows 
that priorities outlined in most of the calls tend to be largely repetitions 
of the general aims of the regional plans due to weaknesses in the DA 
staff competencies and lack of reliable regional databases. As most of the 
interviewees concur, this leaves considerable leeway in the distribution 
of financial resources to a potentially wide range of priorities at the 
implementation stage, which cannot be monitored and evaluated according 
to pre-determined measurable indicators, increasing the possibilities for 
political influence.
Local power relationships appear to be more debilitating for the lagging 
regions. In the regional plan for Mardin-Batman-Şırnak-Siirt region for 
example, Measure 2.2.1. explicitly states that the determination of the 
4. This issue was the subject of a motion 
proposed by 30 members of parliament of 
the main opposition party to investigate 
the distribution of DAs’ financial resources, 
which are claimed to be used for purposes 
contrary to law to support the purchase 
of machinery and equipment of certain 
industrial establishments and the routine 
activities of local authorities (TBMM, 2012). 
The proposed motion was however declared 
invalid due to the failure to come to a 
conclusion by the end of the legislative year.
5. The weakness of the relationship between 
regional plans and calls for proposals is also 
highlighted in Devlet Denetleme Kurulu 
(2014, 777-80).
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location of new industrial sites “should not be according to political and 
local pressures”, but on the basis of analyses informed by scientific data 
(Dicle Development Agency, 2013, 326). Similarly, Measure 1.7.4. of the 
same plan states that in supporting new entrepreneurs action should be 
taken “to avoid local pressures” (Dicle Development Agency, 2013, 290). 
According to the plan entrepreneurship and production in the region 
are monopolized by a few families and consequently potential young 
entrepreneurs outside these families are discouraged from commercializing 
new ideas (Dicle Development Agency, 2013, 290).
Interview responses additionally indicate the presence of serious problems 
in the procedures for independent evaluation of project proposals. There 
is widespread perception of “unfair distribution of financial resources” 
(Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 782-83). All of the interviews with the 
DA staff further concur that there is a general perception among local 
stakeholders that the DAs can be used simply to make money. These 
empirical findings suggest that there is a real danger that the distribution 
of financial resources may be dominated by the short-term inward looking 
concerns of the local political and business elites. 
Multi-level Governance 
With regard to the horizontal dimension of multi-level governance, 35 out 
of 37 interviewees claim that the process of formulating both the first and 
the second rounds of regional plans were participatory to a great extent. 
Activity reports of the DAs further show that in every region the process 
of formulating regional plans involved extensive meetings, workshops and 
surveys with thousands of local people. Interviews indicate, however that 
these participatory processes were one-off, limited to the plan preparation 
stage and as such did not continue beyond that stage. With regard to the 
Development Councils, which were designed to engage societal actors in 
the day-to-day activities of the DAs and thus to ensure ongoing, regular 
participation, most of the interviewees are unison in agreement that they 
– the Development Councils – “are completely ineffective” (interview 24). 
The membership of the Development Councils for each DA is determined 
by the Council of Ministers at the central level, who updates the list of 
members at certain intervals.  According to this list, the public sector 
dominates membership at the expense of civil society (Official Journal, 
2013). Moreover, according to law the decisions of the Development 
Councils are not binding for the Board of Directors (Official Journal, 
2006a). The issue of participation gets even more complicated in regions 
in the Southeast where identity politics dominates and where mayors 
and provincial councils represent pro-Kurdish political parties, who are 
outright opposed to the DAs viewing them “as the sub-national face of the 
central state” (interview 10). In these regions “some of the members do not 
even attend the meetings” (interview 16) and there is “a general climate 
of impossibility of cooperation among members of the Council created by 
ideological polarization” (interview 27). The evaluation report observes 
that participation in the meetings of the Development Councils across all 
regions has declined over the years while no meetings at all take place in 
several regions (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 779). 
The failure of the DAs to engage with local stakeholders on a regular 
basis is compounded by the weakness of the bottom-up demand for 
development policies according to interviewees. While labor and civil 
society in Turkey in general are weak, they also lack regional territorial 
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organization and cannot politicize and translate regional problems of 
economic development into effective political demands.
With regard to the vertical dimension of multi-level governance, the 
interviews suggest that the interventions of the Ministry of Development 
both exceed its coordinative role provided in law and do not intend to 
remove development traps involved in local power relationships. Thirty-
two out of 37 interviewees complain that “centralization is still the norm” 
(interview 20) (6). One interviewee claims: 
“An ordinary civil servant in Ankara may object to a decision taken 
through participatory processes by the DA. For example, in the regional 
plan most of the stakeholders in the region take part in determining 
which sectors to be supported. However, a civil servant in the Ministry 
of Development may disagree and tell us to support another sector” 
(interview 15). 
The excessive interventions of the Ministry of Development in the decisions 
of the Executive Boards not only undermine the accountability of the latter, 
but also render the DAs “inflexible, slow-moving and non-participatory” 
structures (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 779). Furthermore, there is 
widespread agreement among interviewees concerning the absence of 
a clear strategic orientation on the part of the Ministry of Development 
(see also İzmir Development Agency, 2016, 108-9). In the words of an 
interviewee: 
“The bureaucrats at the Ministry of Development do not know what they 
want out of the DAs and they are confused about how they should guide 
them” (interview 32). 
This is partly related with the fact that within the Ministry those 
responsible for the co-ordination of the DAs are (assistant) experts 
dispersed among various units where DA-related work is of secondary 
importance (Devlet Denetleme Kurulu, 2014, 795). 
Research on other forms of central government intervention also shows 
that the relevance of multi-level governance is undermined especially in 
certain metropolitan regions. As argued by Eraydın and Taşan-Kok (2014), 
even though planning rights for metropolitan areas were decentralized to 
municipalities in the early 2000s, in the following years these rights were 
rapidly transferred back to several central government bodies including 
various line ministries (such as for industry, tourism and environment) 
as well as the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ). Research on 
İstanbul, for example, shows how the top-down decisions of the urban 
coalition consisting of the central government, local authorities and TOKİ 
driven by urban land rents and real-estate development define İstanbul’s 
development (Türkün, 2011; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2008). This is in sharp contrast to the vision formulated 
for İstanbul in the regional plan for 2014-2023, which centers around an 
innovative economy based on high value added manufacturing, social 
inclusion and environmental sustainability (İstanbul Development Agency, 
2014).
Multi-level governance, in both horizontal and vertical versions, as 
practiced in Turkey is therefore at the hierarchical end of a spectrum where 
the other opposite end is of a networked type.
Co-ordination 
Given that the number of policy areas and the diversity of policy resources 
at the disposal of the DAs are quite limited, implementation of regional 
6. It was explained in section 2 under “The 
Policy Instruments Approach” that the 
purpose of this article is to uncover both the 
intended and unintended consequences of 
DAs. It follows that the gap between rules 
embedded in the technical component of 
instruments and their implementation by 
actors is a subject of empirical investigation. 
Hence, it was a possibility that the Ministry 
of Development could have in practice only 
overseen development in general terms and 
could have left considerable discretionary 
powers with regard to strategic initiatives 
and implementation to the DAs. However, 
the fact that most of the interviewees, 
irrespective of whether they represent the 
public or private sectors or the civil society, 
concur that this has not been the case is a 
significant finding. 
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plans is highly dependent on the DAs’ capacity for co-ordination of public 
investments in their region. The non-binding nature of regional plans over 
decisions concerning national investments and local plans prepared by 
municipalities is frequently described as the “biggest handicap” faced by 
the DAs among interviewees (interview 25) (see also İzmir Development 
Agency, 2016, 108-9). In fact, 29 interviewees out of 37 think that regional 
plans should be binding and should have own budget for implementation. 
A number of steps have been taken to facilitate co-ordination at the central 
level, as a majority of the interviewees point out. One is the formulation 
of a National Strategy for Regional Development (BGUS) to provide a 
framework and orientation not only for regional plans but also for line 
ministries (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014). Another is the formation of a 
Regional Development High Board composed of ministers (such as for 
industry, technology, labor and social security, agriculture, transport, 
tourism, environment and urbanization, and forestry) and a Regional 
Development Committee composed of undersecretaries. The expectation 
out of these initiatives is for line ministries to “acquire a sense of 
ownership” (interview 12) over the regional plans and hence make their 
investment decisions accordingly. 
There are a number of reasons for claiming that this expectation is naïve 
at best and these reasons do not even include the fact that some key 
ministries for regional development (such as for education and health) are 
absent in the Regional Development High Board. Research on horizontal 
co-ordination in the European context has shown that macro-level 
processes, such as the acceptance of BGUS as a general policy principle, 
do not necessarily influence the micro-level of everyday policymaking 
(Schout and Jordan, 2007). There are strong path-dependencies in the 
functional specialization of the public sector in Turkey and policy-makers 
working on individual items of policy can too easily ignore consideration 
of regional consequences. The following remark by the representatives of 
public institutions (provincial directorates of line ministries) interviewed 
illustrates the challenge: “Our budget is 16 times bigger in comparison to 
the DA budget. What can they achieve that we cannot?” (Interviews 17 and 
35). While this remark obviously shows that the tiny size of the DA budgets 
decreases the latter’s relevance for other actors in the region, it also alludes 
to the fact that public sector rationality is geared towards solving core 
tasks rather than collaborating for a greater public good. Hence, effective 
co-ordination requires nothing less than administrative implementing 
mechanisms in day-to-day policy processes for identifying priorities, 
carrying out impact assessments, and sustaining the necessary political 
pressure (Schout and Jordan, 2007, 842). 
CONCLUSION
This article evaluates the challenges for regional development governance 
in Turkey by focusing on the role of Regional Development Agencies. In 
doing so, the article shows that as seemingly neutral and technical policy 
instruments, the DAs are in fact highly political and politicized and have 
important political consequences. Empirical findings suggest that the 
effects of technical instrumentation or operationalization of the DAs are 
such that their human resources and knowledge assets are not adequate. 
Even though highly-qualified personnel were recruited to begin with, the 
loss of staff over time and high turnover rates, coupled with insufficient 
training provided for requisite skills, make it almost impossible to 
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accumulate long years of experience and learning through trial and error. 
Hence, empirical evidence suggests that the DA staff, by and large, do 
not possess the necessary technical and political skills and experience to 
manage multiple actor dynamics in the regions and to form intra-regional 
networks. Potentially, the General Secretary could play such a pivotal role. 
However, empirical evidence on the effects of social instrumentation of the 
DAs shows that General Secretaries are overwhelmed by pressure from 
local actors represented in the Board of Directors. The kind of pressure 
exerted by local actors represented in the Board of Directors, as empirical 
evidence shows, is for engagement about a certain exchange (receiving 
as much of the financial resources distributed by DAs as possible) rather 
than for a long-term engagement to realize a certain imagined future 
for the region. The latter requires that the DAs generate partnerships 
with the potential to produce new possibilities for the partners and their 
interrelationships and in so doing, produce new collaborations, new ideas 
and visions of development. In Turkey’s case, it can be clearly deduced 
from empirical findings that local actors perceive the DAs as devices 
for accomplishing their own objectives rather than as partnerships for 
producing new possibilities of development.
On the basis of empirical evidence concerning other dimensions of the 
social instrumentation of the DAs, it can be claimed that there is no 
collaboration among actors within all stages of the policy cycle, which, 
if existed, would have contributed to better strategy formulation and 
implementation. The local actors, including not only those represented 
in the Board of Directors but also more broadly in the Development 
Councils and beyond, participate meaningfully only in the plan 
preparation stage. However, plans are multiannual and hence plan 
preparation stage takes place only once every few years. At the decision-
making and implementation stages, DAs operate according to the logic 
of top-down framing, whereby the Boards of Directors take decisions 
without involvement of Development Councils. In turn, the Ministry 
of Development unilaterally interferes in decisions taken by the Boards 
without leaving any discretionary power to the latter with respect to 
strategic initiatives and implementation. The local actors not represented 
in the Boards of Directors participate neither in decision-making nor 
implementation stages. Thus, evidence of multi-level governance is weak. 
To the extent that multi-level governance exists, it operates in highly 
inflexible and segmented ways. This hinders the DAs from mobilizing 
endogenous growth capacities. Empirical evidence concerning the social 
instrumentation of DAs further shows that top-down framing also 
produces effects that render the DAs without capacity for integrated 
implementation as the plans they formulate are neither binding nor have 
their own budget. The solutions sought at the central level through forging 
institutional coordination mechanisms have the effect of removing the DAs 
further from the center stage of policy integration, greatly hindering the 
latter from becoming engines of development in their regions.
These empirical findings suggest that, on the whole, the DAs lack the 
capacity to act as focal points for empowerment of sub-national actors and 
to foster cross-sectoral collaboration between public and private sectors and 
civil society. Hence, it can be argued that the DAs neither have the potential 
to be engines of development nor the potential to institutionalize regions 
as legitimate political forms. As such the DAs are largely failing to manage 
multiscalar relations of governance for the purpose of promoting regional 
development. The findings show that the crucial added value of the 
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Turkish DAs is to act as the interpreter of territory needs and expectations 
through formulating regional plans, which often involve more diverse 
developmental perspectives than provided for by the National Strategy 
for Regional Development. This benefit is, however, lost due to lack of 
power, lack of resources and weak administrative capacity of the central 
administration to remove local development traps. In particular, the one-
size-fits-all approach for regions that are socio-economically, politically and 
ethnically diverse is proving to be highly inadequate. In sum, the DAs in 
Turkey represent a form of institutional “layering” (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010) whereby there is rule change on the margins but the dominant 
traditional characteristics of the hierarchical mode of governance are not 
challenged. Whereas the situation in the new EU member states of Central 
and Eastern European countries in the 1990s was similar to Turkey’s, both 
the involvement of the EU and pressure from local actors below had led 
national governments to willingly give up part of their exclusive control 
on regional governance in these countries. In Turkey’s case the functioning 
and operations of the DAs are largely uncoupled from the EU process. 
This article’s focus has been on common patterns of regional governance 
challenges across regions. Nevertheless, a number of observations can 
be made with regard to regional variations. First, while all regions lack 
“cohesive regional developmental alliances” (Bruszt, 2008, 618), the one 
region that arguably comes closer to this notion is İzmir where a sense of 
regional purpose and direction and shared understandings among actors 
exist. In comparison to other regions, there are relatively more clear and 
precise views among local actors on a variety of issues concerning strategic 
priorities. One plausible reason is the pre-existing culture of associative 
relationships whereby a local cross-sectoral (business-led, but also 
including civic institutions and the public sector) alliance took the initiative 
to set up a DA for İzmir in the 1990s. Another possible reason is the relative 
lack of central government interference in İzmir economy (Ataöv and 
Eraydın, 2011). A third possible reason is that being a one-province region, 
İzmir largely escapes from problems caused by inter-provincial rivalries.
The political and policy implications of the DAs analyzed from a policy 
instruments approach in this article are manifold. At a minimum, as 
mechanisms for evidence-based policy making, such as regional databases, 
policy and program evaluations, and impact assessment, are not in place, 
both regional and national capacity for policy innovation through learning 
is severely limited. Moreover, the analysis in this article shows that the 
DAs in Turkey are largely failing to mobilize endogenous growth capacities 
through developmental collaborations between local actors. Above all, 
short-term inward looking concerns of the local political and business 
elites in the distribution of the DAs’ financial resources serve to consolidate 
existing local power structures rather than transforming them. As such it 
is reasonable to claim, on the basis of empirical findings, that the political 
consequences of the functioning of DAs are making it even more difficult to 
transform these power relations through public policies in the future.
APPENDIX 1. List of Interviewees
In order to ensure full anonymity for the interviewees, the list does not 
disclose the identity of the regions. 
1. Region A, General Secretariat
2. Region A, Development Council, NGO
3. Region A, Executive Board, private sector
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4. Region A, Executive Board, public sector
5. Region B, General Secretariat
6. Region B, Development Council, NGO
7. Region B, Development Council, NGO
8. Region B, Chamber of Industry
9. Region C, Provincial General Assembly
10. Region C, Executive Board, public sector 
11. Region C, General Secretariat
12. Region C, General Secretariat
13. Region C, General Secretariat
14. Region C, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
15. Region C, Executive Board, private sector 
16. Region C, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
17. Region C, Development Council, public sector
18. Region C, Development Council, private sector
19. Region D, Development Council, private sector
20. Region D, Executive Board, private sector
21. Region D, General Secretariat
22. Region E, General Secretariat
23. Region E, General Secretariat
24. Region E, General Secretariat
25. Region E, General Secretariat
26. Region E, Development Council, municipality
27. Region E, Development Council, municipality
28. Region E, Development Council, municipality
29. Region F, General Secretariat
30. Region F, General Secretariat
31. Region F, General Secretariat
32. Region F, Governorate,
33. Region F, Governorate
34. Region F, Governorate
35. Region F, Development Council, public sector
36. Region F, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
37. Region F, Chamber of Commerce and Industry
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TÜRKİYE’DE BÖLGESEL YÖNETİŞİMİN ZORLUKLARI:  
KALKINMA AJANSLARININ ROLÜ
Bu makale Türkiye’de kurulan Bölge Kalkınma Ajanslarının işlevlerini 
siyasa araçları yaklaşımı ile inceleyerek bölgesel yönetişim üzerindeki 
istenilen ve istem dışı sonuçlarını tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. 
Siyasa araçları yaklaşımı, araçların siyasa hedeflerini en etkili şekilde 
gerçekleştirmek üzere kurgulanmış sadece teknik ve tarafsız aygıtlardan 
ibaret olduklarını öne süren işlevselci görüşe karşı çıkmaktadır. Aksine, 
makale göstermektedir ki siyasa araçları olarak Kalkınma Ajansları son 
derece siyasidir ve işleyişlerinin önemli siyasi sonuçları vardır. Makale, 
resmi doküman ve raporların kapsamlı bir değerlendirmesi ile 2011 ve 
2014 yılları arasında altı farklı bölgede yerel paydaşlarla yapılmış yarı-
yapılandırılmış mülakatlardan elde edilmiş orijinal verilerin analizine 
dayanmaktadır. Bulgular ışığında makale Kalkınma Ajanslarının, gerek 
ulus-altı aktörleri güçlendirebilecek odak noktaları olarak hareket etme 
kapasitelerinin, gerekse de kamu, özel sektör ve sivil toplum arasında 
bölge içi ağları teşvik etme kapasitelerinin zayıf olduğunu savunmaktadır. 
Bulgular, siyasa döngüsü içerisinde karar verme ve uygulama safhalarında 
yerel aktörler arasında ve yerel aktörlerle merkezi aktörler arasında işbirliği 
olmadığını, yerel aktörlerin Kalkınma Ajanslarını, yeni kalkınma imkânları 
üretecek ortaklıklar olarak değil de, kendi amaçlarını gerçekleştirmek 
üzere kullanabilecekleri aygıtlar olarak gördüklerini göstermektedir. Bu 
bulguların işaret ettiği, Kalkınma Ajanslarının içsel büyüme kapasitelerini 
harekete geçirememelerinin bölgelerinde kalkınma motoru işlevi 
görmelerine engel olduğudur. Genel olarak Kalkınma Ajansları bölgesel 
kalkınmayı destekleme amaçlı çok düzlemli yönetişim ilişkilerini 
yürütmede büyük ölçüde başarısız kalmaktadırlar.
CHALLENGES FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN TURKEY:  
THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
This article examines the functioning of Regional Development Agencies 
(DAs) in Turkey from a policy instruments approach with a view to 
uncovering their intended and unintended consequences for regional 
governance. The policy instruments approach challenges the functionalist 
view that instruments are merely technical and neutral devices for 
realizing policy aims in the most effective way. Instead, the article shows 
that as policy instruments, the DAs are highly political with important 
political consequences. The article is based on original data collected and 
generated from an extensive review of official documents and reports 
and semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders in six different 
regions conducted between 2011 and 2014. On the basis of the findings, 
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the article argues that the DAs in Turkey lack the capacity to act as focal 
points for empowerment of sub-national actors and to foster intra-regional 
networks between public and private sectors and civil society. Findings 
show that there is lack of collaboration both between and among different 
groups of local and those of central actors within the decision-making and 
implementation stages of the policy cycle and that local actors perceive 
the DAs as devices for accomplishing their own objectives rather than 
as partnerships for producing new possibilities of development. These 
findings indicate that the DAs are far from mobilizing endogenous growth 
capacities, greatly hindering them from becoming engines of development 
in their regions. Overall, the DAs are largely failing to manage 
multiscalar relations of governance for the purpose of promoting regional 
development.
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